Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 14

Number 2

Article 3

National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in UK Merger
Control
Ioannis Kokkoris
Queen Mary University London, i.kokkoris@qmul.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 47-73
Recommended Citation

Kokkoris, Ioannis. "National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in
UK Merger Control." Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 2 (2021) : 47-73.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.2.1919
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss2/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

National Security as a Public Interest Consideration in UK
Merger Control
Abstract
The article will discuss the boundaries of UK merger control set by national security
concerns against the background of public interest considerations in the decisional
practice of the competent authorities. The article will first present an overview of the
existing legal framework for considering public interest when reviewing mergers and
acquisitions in strategic industries or companies. It will then present the main precedents
where issues of national security were raised and will discuss how the CMA and the
Secretary of State assessed these transactions from both a competition and national
security angle. Finally, the article will present the recent legislative initiative by the UK
Government to extend national security grounds reflects a new approach towards FDI.
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Introduction
As the multilateral approach to international trade has lost its appeal in
recent years, foreign direct investments (FDIs) in strategic industries or
companies are increasingly subject to non-competition scrutiny based
on public interest considerations. While such considerations are not
new to merger control, their potential to introduce or complement
wider industrial policy or other priorities that are unrelated to
competition law has brought them back to prominence in many
jurisdictions across the globe. This trend is visible not only in
developing economies, which have traditionally been more prone to
protectionism, but also in the historical proponents of free and open
market economy such as the United States and the European Union.1
In 2018, the U.S. Congress adopted the Foreign Investment Risk
Review Modernization Act, which was implemented immediately by the
provisional Pilot Program to Review Certain Transactions Involving
Foreign Persons and Critical Technologies.2 The reform expanded FDI
review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) to include mandatory reporting of both controlling and
noncontrolling investments in as many as twenty seven industries.3 At
the same time, in the EU, following the European Commission’s
(Commission) heavily criticized decision to block the Siemens/Alstom
merger, there have been voices advocating for a formal procedure
allowing the Council to override merger scrutiny based on noncompetition, public interest considerations.4 Even today, legitimate
interests, such as public security, plurality of the media, and prudential
rules, as well as other public interests that have been approved by the
Commission, may justify additional intervention by national
authorities.5
Similar screening mechanisms already exist or are being considered by
many Member States with respect to transactions that are not subject
to Commission review, which could lead to inconsistent enforcement
and complex remedies, potentially exceeding the scope of the
respective theory of harm and being used to achieve objectives of other
policies such as trade. Recently, Hungary introduced a screening
mechanism in January 2019, while Sweden and the Czech Republic are
expected to follow suit. Overall, nearly half of the Member States have
some form of public interest screening, either as part of the merger
control assessment or within separate procedures on an ad hoc basis.
47
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This shows the increasing relevance of such mechanisms for legal
enforcement and certainty amidst the increasing geopolitical tensions.
Moreover, there are significant differences in scope and procedure:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Ex-ante/ex-post assessment
Voluntary/mandatory notification
General/sectoral coverage
Companies/assets coverage
Applicability to investments from other Member States and
third countries or third countries only, end the list.6

To enhance transparency and provide legal certainty, without
harmonizing national screening mechanisms, Regulation 2019/452
established a procedural framework for cooperation between Member
States and the Commission where an FDI in one or more Member
States may affect the security or public order of another Member State
or the EU.7 Given its limited scope, however, the Regulation neither
requires Member States to apply public interest scrutiny to FDIs nor
does it replace existing screening mechanisms with a European onestop-shop screening. Therefore, as this article will demonstrate, each
jurisdiction still enjoys a closer look at specific public interest
considerations, and indeed necessary, in the current state of
international trade.
In several jurisdictions, national security is one of the public interest
considerations that is taken into account in the assessment of an
acquisition or merger involving a foreign entity and domestic
entity/assets. In terms of procedure, the threats to national security
that a transaction may entail can be considered either by the competent
competition authority, along the substantive competition law based
appraisal of a merger, as in the United Kingdom (integrated model), or
by another public body, such as a sectoral regulator or a government
department, concurrently or subsequently to the competition
proceedings as in the United States (dual model).8 The dual model is by
far the most common, and interestingly, in Europe, Poland is the only
jurisdiction where public interest considerations are assessed by the
competition authority and no ministerial intervention is required. In
terms of substance, some jurisdictions use precise and narrow
definitions of public interest, while others prefer an open list of public
interest considerations, or a broader, more flexible definition, leaving a
considerable margin of discretion to the decision-making body. It is
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nevertheless possible to distinguish the following categories of public
interest considerations:
1. General and specific considerations (for example, in the
energy sector: Security of supply and stable provision of
energy)
2. Economic (protection of small and medium enterprises) and
non-economic considerations (protection of employment,
environment or public health).9
Given its frequent use, flexible meaning, and protectionist potential,
national security stands out as one of the most controversial public
interest considerations.10 This is more so in the UK, a jurisdiction with
long experience in assessing concentrations pursuant to a public
interest standard. It is worth noting that amidst complicated Brexit
negotiations the recent government proposals on a new national
security regime drastically lower the regulatory thresholds enhancing
the national security scrutiny.11
Historically, public interest considerations have been part of UK
merger control since the 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act. The 1973
Fair Trading Act followed suit and introduced a broad public interest
test based on five major public interest categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Maintaining and promoting effective competition,
Price, quality and variety considerations,
Innovation, potential competition and reduction of costs,
Balanced distribution of the industry and employment and
finally
5. International competitiveness.12
In 2002, however, the Enterprise Act (EA 2002) used effective
competition as the primary test for substantive appraisal of mergers
and left little room for public interest considerations.13 Most recently,
the government again reversed course and drastically lowered the
regulatory thresholds to ease scrutiny of foreign acquisitions based on
national security grounds. There are still several other public interest
exceptions, whose examination could provide a clearer picture of where
national security stands in UK merger control.
This article will address, therefore, the boundaries of UK merger
control set by national security concerns against the background of
public interest considerations in the decisional practice of the
49
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competent authorities. Accordingly, this article will first present an
overview of the existing legal framework for considering public interest
when reviewing mergers and acquisitions in strategic industries or
companies. Next, it centers its attention on cases that have raised
national security concerns, to outline the Government’s current
approach to such concerns. Also, this article will discuss the
ramifications of the recent legislative and policy developments that
have significantly extended the leeway for national security
considerations in UK merger control. As a final remark, it is crucial to
indicate that despite the abundant literature in relation to the nature of
national security as a public good and the implications the nonrivalrous and non-excludable nature of a public good has for national
security assessment, the analysis of such a topic falls outside the scope
of this article. However, it is worth emphasizing the importance of
public goods theory for the assessment of national security.14

The Framework for Considering Public Interest in UK
Merger Control
Although the EA 2002 guarantees the primacy of a competition-based
merger control in the UK, there are several public interest
considerations which could justify a government intervention to block
or conditionally approve a transaction. The grounds for and specific
types of such interventions will set the stage for a more detailed
description of institutional and procedural framework for considering
public interest. The section concludes with a summary of the criticism
that has been raised against this merger control framework.
Grounds and Types of Public Interest Intervention
Prior to the EA 2002, mergers in the UK were reviewed under a broad
and imprecise public interest test, against which the relevant
competition authority would only advise the Secretary of State on
whether a transaction operates or may be expected to operate against
the public interest.15 The Secretary of State would then make a final
decision on how to remedy such adverse effects, including prohibition,
structural or behavioral undertaking from the merging parties.16 While
the concept of public interest did include competition considerations,
and eventually only a few prohibitions were issued, the fact that from
1973 to 2001 the Secretary of State disregarded the competition
assessment and advice on thirty-one occasions, suggests that the then
50
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regime failed to provide much needed transparency and predicable
outcomes.17
Even though the so-called Tebbit doctrine would reverse this practice
in 1984, making competition assessment the rule while almost
completely ignoring the previously dominant wider public interest
consideration, it was not until the EA 2002 that the UK introduced a
formal merger control competition test - substantial lessening of
competition (SLC).18 As a result, there is a clear line between
competition concerns and public interest considerations in merger
control. Furthermore, there is no room left for political intervention
with respect to SLC assessment. Finally, it includes the following public
interest as part of an exceptional intervention mechanism:
1. Specific statutory public interest considerations
2. The Secretary of State may decide new or additional public
interest considerations, subject to subsequent parliamentary
approval.19
Currently, there are three statutory public interest considerations:
National security, newspaper and media plurality, and the stability of
the UK financial system.20 While national security was the only public
interest consideration when the Enterprise Act was adopted in 2002,
subsequent amendments completed the list with newspaper and media
plurality and the stability of the financial system.21 The latter is also
the only public interest consideration to date that has been added by an
order of the Secretary of State, during the review of the Lloyds/HBOs
merger in 2008.22 Despite the cautious use of this power to include new
or additional public interest considerations, its existence and rationale,
besides saving time whenever necessary, have been criticized for
limiting the extent and effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. As an
illustration, it took the Parliament only 9 days to approve the new
public interest concern in Lloyds/HBOs.23
The Secretary of State may raise each of the three public interest
considerations mentioned above during three types of public interest
intervention. They can also be part of two groups depending on
whether a competition-based merger control takes place in parallel.
The competition authority reviews transactions involving a government
contractor in the defense sector or newspaper/media companies which
supply at least one quarter of the newspapers/broadcasting of any
51
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description and meets neither the UK nor the EU jurisdictional
threshold, and the Secretary of State may issue a Special Public Interest
Notice (SPIN). However, the cease to be distinct test still applies to
special merger situations.24 By contrast, where the Competition and
Markets Authority (CMA) or the European Commission are already
investigating a merger, the Secretary of State may, depending on the
case, intervene by issuing a Public Interest Intervention Notice (PIIN)
or a European Intervention Notice (EIN). The former requires that a
transaction constitutes a relevant merger situation, whereas the latter
applies to a concentration with an EU dimension.25
Figure 1. The UK Public Interest Merger Procedure (PIIN).

Source: Author
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With respect to national security, redefining any of these jurisdictional
concepts—by lowering the required turnover thresholds—can
significantly expand the scope of merger control, typically in pursuit of
non-competition policy goals, and allow for more frequent public
interventions. However, as far as EIN are concerned, any public
interest considerations which do not fall under the category of
legitimate interests—public security, plurality of media and prudential
rules—need prior approval by the European Commission.26
It is worth emphasizing at this point that although the article focuses
on the implications of public interest intervention based on national
security concerns for merger control, it is possible that such a public
intervention cloaks the trade policy implementation. This is not as
evident in the UK as it is in other jurisdictions. For example, in
response to the initiatives of foreign entity targeting in the United
States, China’s Ministry of Commerce has also adopted the Provisions
on the Unreliable Entity List which became law on 19th September
2020.27 According to Article 1 of the law, it aims at safeguarding
national sovereignty, security and development interests, maintaining
fair and free international economic and trade order, as well as
protecting the legitimate rights and interests of enterprises, other
organizations, and individuals of China.28 A legitimate concern is that
this list as well as the similar list the US government has published can
be used as a legitimatized façade to impose sanctions on countries
rather than entities themselves. The Qualcomm/Broadcom and
NXP/Qualcomm transactions illustrate the impact that such policies
can have on entities, as they became victims of the trade war and the
broader geopolitical tensions between the United States and China. 29

Institutional and Procedural Framework of Public Interest
Intervention
In contrast to the paradigm shift it operated with respect to the
substantive test for merger control, the EA 2002 essentially preserved
the former institutional and procedural approach to public interest
considerations. At the same time, it also seems to have given credit to
the idea that public interest interventions are mainly political, hence
biased, and arbitrary. Currently, the Secretary of State for Business,
Energy, and Industrial Strategy—or, in the case of newspaper or media
mergers, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport—
53
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(Secretary of State) is at the center of an institutional and procedural
framework which aims to ensure that public interests are duly
considered whenever the competition appraisal of a merger might
interfere with it. The Secretary of State must act in a scrupulously fair
and impartial manner, in other words, in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Following the 2013 reform, which abolished the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) and the Competition Commission and merged their functions
into the CMA, the Secretary of State cooperates primarily with the
competition authority to establish and remedy an issue of public
interest during merger review.30 Occasionally, where a transaction
concerns newspaper or media companies, the procedure also involves
the Office of Communications (Ofcom), which would be advising on the
public interest concerned in parallel to the competition assessment by
the CMA.31 Either way, as far as public interest interventions are
concerned, the communications regulator and the competition
authority are tasked with gathering and analyzing input from various
stakeholders, such as the competent ministry or government
department and the industry concerned, which is then reported in a
timely manner to the relevant Secretary of State.
The procedure itself commences with the Secretary of State, either
upon a recommendation from the CMA or sua sponte, issuing an
intervention notice—a SPIN, a PIIN, or an EIN—that outlines the
relevant public interest consideration(s) whenever he believes that it is
or may be the case that one or more than one public interest
consideration is relevant to a consideration of the relevant merger
situation.32 Accordingly, either the CMA or the Ofcom proceeds to
prepare a report in relation to the specified public interest and whether
it might be at issue, based on feedback to a public interest test of the
merger under review. Additionally, where a transaction falls under its
jurisdiction, the CMA will present its Phase 1 conclusions on the
competition assessment of the merger. Those conclusions should, in
particular, address whether there is a relevant merger situation,
whether the merger could result in a substantial lessening of
competition, whether the markets concerned are of sufficient
importance, whether the arrangements are sufficiently far advanced,
whether there are outweighing benefits which offset the adverse effects
of substantially lessening of competition, and whether it would be
appropriate to deal with the matter by way of undertakings.33 By
contrast, where a merger is being reviewed by the European
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Commission, the CMA has no competence to assess the competition
aspects of the case; it can only deal with the public interest
considerations specified in the EIN and make the appropriate
recommendation to the Secretary of State. This initial phase concludes
within a deadline set by the Secretary of State in its intervention notice,
which is typically the statutory forty-day period for completing Phase 1
assessment of all mergers. However, it is possible to reduce this period
where necessary, considering the urgency of the matter for example, 26
working days in Lloyds/HBOS.34
At this stage of the procedure, in light of the CMA or Ofcom public
interest reports, the Secretary of State may:
1. Clear the merger, including where public interest outweighs
any anti-competitive concerns
2. Refer it to the CMA for an in-depth Phase 2 investigation
3. Accept undertakings from the parties concerned in lieu of a
Phase 2 reference.35
While all public interest cases to date have resulted in undertakings
addressing the Secretary of State’s concerns, the CMA may be required
to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the relevant public interest
consideration, even where there is no likelihood of substantial
lessening of competition—the standard threshold for a Phase 2
reference.36 In any event, the Secretary of State must accept the Phase 1
competition assessment; he may disregard it in the name of a specific
public interest, but cannot call it into question to trigger an in-depth
inquiry. Thus, any anti-competitive outcome would be adverse to the
public interest unless there is a relevant public interest consideration
justifying it.37 By contrast, the Secretary of State can under no
circumstance allow a merger to take place on public interest grounds
where the European Commission has already prohibited it competition
grounds.
Phase 2 assessment of public interest considerations is similar to that
of ordinary merger cases.38 The CMA Inquiry Group is in charge of
reviewing the matter and preparing a detailed report within 24 weeks,
which can be extended by another 8 weeks in case of special reasons. 39
Importantly, no new public interest consideration or such that has not
been finalized by the end of the twenty-fourth week following the
Secretary of State’s public interest intervention notice may be part of
the in-depth inquiry. The Secretary of State may, however, delay a
55
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Phase 2 reference until the public interest consideration is finalized at
Phase 1 or, if earlier, 24 week period expires.40 The questions that need
to be addressed during this inquiry include whether a relevant merger
situation has been created or arrangements are in progress or in
contemplation which, if carried into effect, will result in the creation of
a relevant merger situation, whether such a situation has or may be
expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition, whether,
taking account only of any substantial lessening of competition and/or
the admissible public interest consideration or considerations
concerned, the creation of that situation operates or may be expected to
operate against the public interest, and most importantly, whether the
Secretary of State or anyone else should take an action for the purpose
of remedying, mitigating or preventing any of the effects adverse to the
public interest which have resulted from, or may be expected to result
from, the creation of the relevant merger situation.41
Upon receipt of the CMA’s Phase 2 recommendations, which need to
provide a comprehensive a solution as is reasonable and practicable to
the adverse effects to the public interest, the Secretary of State has
thirty days to decide whether to make an adverse public interest
finding, or to make a no finding at all in the matter, thereby clearing
the merger.42 A no-finding decision is warranted only where there is no
public interest consideration which is relevant to a consideration of the
relevant merger situation concerned.43 On the other hand, an adverse
public interest finding enables the Secretary of State to take such
actions that can reasonably remedy, mitigate, or prevent the adverse
effects to the public interest, including where necessary the prohibition
of the merger on public interest grounds.
Overall, the UK public interest institutional and procedural framework
represents a complex mechanism involving a regulator and a political
decision maker. The CMA’s duty in Phase 1 is to collect, summarize and
publish all representations from the relevant parties. In a Phase 2
investigation, in contrast, the CMA has wide powers to investigate the
public interest implications of the relevant merger case.44 In practice,
some argue that the joint decision-making mechanism brings along a
transparent process compared to a sole ministerial decision-making
process due to the autonomous nature of the competition authority and
that of its assessment.45
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Critical Assessment of the Framework for Considering Public
Interest
The institutional and procedural setting for considering public interest
in UK merger control is not without criticism. One common line of
criticism is that the CMA lacks extensive expertise in national security
cases.46 Unlike media mergers, occasionally sent to Phase 2, thereby
allowing the CMA to develop the necessary specialist expertise, those
involving national security considerations are solved normally in Phase
1 upon accepting measures from the parties concerned. Furthermore,
the CMA’s role in balancing public interest and competition concerns,
which is far from being a straightforward task, seems to run against its
statutory duty to promote competition.47 However, it is important to
bear in mind that, save for financial stability grounds, public interest
considerations such as media plurality and national security do not
require any balancing against competition assessment. In any event,
since the CMA has no decision-making powers in matters related to the
public interest, any balancing of conflicting considerations at stake falls
upon the Secretary of State.
A second line of criticisms points out the risk of political bias when the
Secretary of State intervenes to review a merger on public interest
grounds. For example, NewsCorp’s bid to acquire the remaining 60.9
percent of the BskyB shares in 2010 was met with unprecedented
skepticism, suggesting that the deal was problematic on political
grounds, among others.48 While initial regulatory concerns revolved
around cross-media ownership issues—NewsCorp was then the biggest
newspaper company in the UK, accounting for one third of the whole
market, and Sky was the biggest broadcaster—subsequent political
scandals, which led to a public inquiry by Lord Justice Leveson,
ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the bid. Also, the then SoS
Vincent Cable stepped down because of a statement to some reporters,
indicating that he had declared war on Rupert Murdoch just after he
issued an EIN on 4 November 2010, and during the investigation a
phone-hacking scandal emerged. Against this background, it was
suggested that a greater involvement of the CMA in assessing public
interest considerations would ensure more consistency and continuity,
hence reducing the unpredictability of political decision-making.49
However, no political decision is, in and of itself, predictable and
perfectly transparent.50 Also, the lack of extensive Phase 2 experience
with national security considerations in merger control, prevents the
57
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CMA from ensuring a degree of consistency that would be welcome for
the legal and business community.
It is noteworthy that the above criticism does not apply equally to all
three of the existing public interest considerations. While the current
institutional and procedural framework seems best suited for dealing
with financial stability concerns—mainly because the CMA has the
enforcement capacity to effectively balance competition and financial
stability consideration and that, given the importance of time in the
finance sector, a final decision by the Secretary of State at the end of
Phase 1 is preferable to a lengthy Phase 2 inquiry—national security
cases might still raise several issues. First, a politically independent
market authority such as the CMA appears to have little legitimacy to
deal with national security matters. By contrast, such matters are less
likely to create a conflict of interest involving political decision-makers.
Furthermore, inadvertent disclosure of sensitive national security
information to the CMA could itself pose a threat to national security.
For example, in Hytera/Sepura the Home Office bypassed the CMA
and presented directly to the Secretary of State about the security
concerns with the transaction under review.51 Finally, there is always
the suspicion that national security as a public interest consideration in
merger control serves for the implementation towards a hidden
industrial policy.

The Assessment of National Security as a UK Public Interest
Consideration
Historically the first statutory public interest consideration in the UK
and, occasionally, cast as something more than a public interest
consideration, national security is also the most common ground for
public intervention in merger control.52 By the end of 2019, the
Secretary of State issued 2 SPINs, 2 PIINs, and 5 EINs to assess and
remedy any adverse effects on national security. As table 1 illustrates,
these cases include General Dynamics/ Alvis,
Finmeccanica/AgustaWestland, Finmeccanica/BAE Systems,
Lockheed Martin/Insys and General Electric/Smiths Aerospace.53
While most of these public interest cases involve defense companies, it
is worth noting that they also represent most of all mergers in the
defense industry.
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Table 1. Public Interest Notices (PIIN/SPIN/EIN) 2002–2019
Date of
Intervention

Case
(PIIN/SPIN/EIN)

Sector

Concern

Outcome

11 March 2004

General Dynamics /
Alvis (EIN)

Defence

Phase 1
Clearance / UILs

26 August 2004

Finmcccanica /
Agusta Westland
(EIN)
Finmcccanica / BAE
(EIN)

Defence

17 August 2005

Lockheed Martin /
Insys (SPIN)

Defence

20 March 2007

General Electric /
Smiths Aerospace
(EIN)
Atlas Elektronik /
Qinetiq (SPIN)

Defence

10 April 2017

Hytera / Sepura
(PIIN)

Communicatio
ns

17 June 2018

Gardner Aerospace /
Northern Aerospace
(PIIN)
Advent / Cobbam
(EIN)

Defence

Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security
Nationa
l
Security

7 February 2005

15 May 2009

20 December 2019

Defence

Defence

Defence

Phase 1
Clearance / UILs
Phase 1
Clearance / UILs
Phase 1
Clearance / UILs
Phase 1
Clearance / UILs
Phase 1
Clearance / UILs
Phase 1
Clearance
Accepted
Phase 1
Clearance
Accepted
Phase 1
Clearance
Accepted

Source: Author.

Given their number and increasingly frequent use—which is likely to
become even more common following the lowered jurisdictional
thresholds and the proposed reform discussed below –, public interest
interventions on national security grounds deserve a closer look as they
can give a better idea about how to understand national security and
the application of such a concept in practice. Indeed, unlike the
statutory definition which equates national security with the EU
concept of public security, the decisional practice so far suggests that
the interpretation of this public interest is narrow, encompassing
concerns that are directly related to the UK’s national defense.
The earliest decision regarding national security aspects as a public
interest consideration under the 2002 Act relates to General
59
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Dynamics/Alvis case.54 The case concerned the acquisition of Alvis that
operated in the design, development, and production of armored
fighting vehicles and military land systems business by a US-based
General Dynamics which operated in aerospace, combat systems,
information systems and technology and marine systems. The MoD, in
this case, expressed two concerns: The maintenance of UK’s strategic
capabilities and the protection of classified information. The Ministry
firstly said that Alvis was the design authority for the British Army’s
armored fighting vehicles. In that regard, the MoD said that it was
unable to update the involved equipment without Alvis’s expertise.
Secondly, the Ministry indicated that some of these capabilities related
to highly classified technology and information. The SoS allowed the
merger to proceed upon UIL’s from General Dynamics. The company
undertook that it would continue to manage military programs which it
is a contractor or sub-contractor. It also committed that it would
ensure the continuity and development of its UK operations. Moreover,
it agreed to operate in line with the UK National Security Regulations
as regards the information security aspects of the classified
information. The MoD stipulated that the company must appoint a
compliance and a security officer and hold inspection powers that its
representatives can use.
The Finmeccanica/AgustaWestland case related to an acquisition by
an Italian holding company, Finmeccanica, of a Dutch company,
AgustaWestland, a joint venture comprising KN and Finmeccanica.55
The MoD put forward the same concerns as it did in General
Dynamics/Alvis case. The decision stated that AgustaWestland was
the design authority for the UK Armed Forces helicopter fleet, and it
has unique skills and knowledge regarding the said equipment. The
parties had to give UILs, which were like those in General
Dynamics/Alvis, to proceed with the merger. In a subsequent decision,
there were similar concerns - Finmeccanica/BAE.56
In the Lockheed Martin Corporation/Insys Ltd. case, the MoD stated
that after the merger Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) there was
an incentive to sell or transfer abroad the essential UK capabilities.57
Moreover, MoD said that the transaction could raise concerns because
LMC could have the incentives to complement and improve their own
capabilities with Insys’s unique capabilities. The Ministry argued that
combining information and technology without UK approval could
have constituted a significant risk to UK security of supply due to the
60
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US International Traffic in Arms Regulations. In Gardner Aerospace
Holdings/Northern Aerospace, in its advice to the SoS, CMA stated
that the parties had undertaken to implement certain measures in
cooperation with the MoD to satisfy the national security concerns
raised by the Government in a related merger that took place before the
proposed transaction. The SoS approved the case on those grounds.58
In the General Electric Company/Smiths Aerospace case, the MoD
identified a third concern: The transfer of ownership.59 The case
involved the acquisition of a British company, Smiths Aerospace (SA),
by a US-based company, General Electric (GE). The MoD stated that
the said acquisition could enable GE to influence SA in a way that could
affect the national security. This concern was also raised in Atlas
Elektronik GmBH UK/Qinetiq's UWs Winfrith Division merger.60 In
the OFT’s report, it was stated that the transaction could have
compromised the independence and impartiality of research outputs
and advice.61 The MoD’s confidence in the independence and
impartiality of such outputs and advice was based on three factors:
1. The fact that Qinetiq is not a major manufacturer or supplier
of weapons systems
2. Rigid compliance regime
3. Government’s share in the company which offsets potential
conflicts of interest. In that connection, MoD called the
independence and impartiality of the merged entity into
question as the company would favor its own products postmerger.
To address these specific concerns, the MoD stipulated that there
should be firewalls between business compartments and that the
merged entity must handle conflicts of interest that would conform
with the published MoD commercial policy.
Hytera/Sepura was the CMA’s first case raising national security
concerns.62 This is the first intervention notice under Section 42 of the
Enterprise Act that the Secretary of State has issued on national
security grounds. The case concerned an acquisition by a Chinese
company, Hytera, of the United Kingdom (UK-based Sepura. Sepura
operated in the market for digital radios and related products for public
sector and commercial customers. The Home Office put forward two
concerns, namely protection of sensitive information and technology
and maintenance of UK capabilities in servicing and maintaining radio
61
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devices used by emergency services and other agencies in the UK. Of
particular significance, the Home Office directly presented to the SoS
some of the national security concerns relating to the acquisition. In
that respect, CMA left any decision to propose remedies to the Home
Office. The CMA’s competitive assessment focused on the products the
parties currently produce, supply, distribute or service and on new
devices in the parties’ pipelines or under consideration.63 Consistent
with its phase 1 role, CMA did not provide any recommendations on the
national security public interest consideration.64 The SoS referred the
transaction to the CMA for a detailed Phase 2 investigation and the
transaction was cleared with undertakings providing assurance that
sensitive information and technology is protected and to ensure the
repair and maintenance of the radio devices used by the emergency
services in the UK.65
Finally, in a recent acquisition which led to an EIN, Advent/Cobham, a
private equity investor (Advent) was acquiring Cobham a provider of
technology and services for the defense, aerospace, and space
industries.66 The European Commission approved the transaction
based on a simplified procedure and the SoS issued an EIN to allow for
a full assessment for national security concerns. The CMA report to the
SoS included a summary of the concerns the CMA received in relation
to national security. According to MoD there were two main areas of
national security concern arising. First, the potential for the parties to
have access to information, either held on, or passing through,
Cobham’s systems, which would allow unauthorized persons to
understand either the detail of MoD capabilities or activity. Second, the
extent to which the transaction posed a risk to existing MoD programs
if the merged entity took decisions to exit from, underinvest in, or move
offshore, the associate capability. According to the Home Office
national security related to physical security in relation to company
processes and premises, system security in IT systems, and personnel
security in relation to employees and company management. Prior to
approval, the SoS accepted undertakings to address the national
security concerns.
As the analysis of the above caselaw illustrates, a balancing exercise
between national security considerations and competition
considerations, would illustrate those competitive concerns could not
overrule national security concerns. Therefore, there would be no
balancing exercise with respect to these aspects as national security
would always supersede competition law concerns. The challenge
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would therefore be to determine the procedural and substantial
procedure of national security in a way that would create a sufficiently
transparent, predictable, and certain environment for the businesses.
The next part examines what the Government attempts to achieve in
the recent legislative reforms.

The Proposed Approach to National Security in UK Merger
Control
The UK’s traditionally strict approach to considering national security
in merger control has gone through a major overhaul in recent years,
arguably as a response to the rapid technological development which
has enabled new, complex, and hard-to-detect threats. While this claim
seems reasonable and in line with similar reforms in other developed
countries, there is still a risk of overshooting the mark and winding up
with a hidden industrial policy agenda, especially in the aftermath of
Brexit. This section will critically assess the proposed shift in approach
to national security in UK merger control by successively examining the
rationale and scope of the reform, the extended merger jurisdiction and
proposed remedies, and how this new approach would coexist within
the existing legislation.
Rationale and Scope (call in) of the Reform
In 2017, the Government started a new consultation with the aim to
broaden the concept of national security. Foreign direct investments
(FDIs) were at the core of the Green Paper which the Government
published in 2017. The Green Paper revealed that the Government was
mainly concerned with espionage, sabotage and exerting of
inappropriate leverage through such investments. In its White Paper,
the Government stated that it intended to introduce a voluntary
notification regime for national security concerns.67 It considered that
there will be around 200 notifications each year within that
framework.68 Within that framework, it designated a call-in power for
the types of mergers which raise national security concerns.69 Of
particular significance, the Government considered to remove national
security grounds from the 2002 Act, detaching the CMA from the
assessment process to make it more efficient.70 The Government stated
that it further aimed to preserve the independence of the CMA. 71
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Considering the current proposals, that national security is not only
about the core defense sector anymore.72 It also includes now restricted
goods and advanced technology. The Hinkley Point C and
Softbank/ARM cases were illustrative of that point.73 In Hinkley Point
C, the Government allowed the development of a nuclear power station
by a partly French state-owned EDF and fully state-owned CGN.74 In
Softbank/ARM, the chip-maker’s acquisition by the Japanese company
was approved by the Government along with commitments.75 It is
worth noting that both cases would be scrutinized under the proposed
national security regime.
The scope of national security is explained in a draft statutory
statement of policy intent (the Policy Statement) published together
with the White Paper,76 which states that the mechanisms described in
the White Paper are limited to national security as distinct from either
the national or public interest but acknowledges that the Government
does not attempt to define the term precisely. According to the Policy
Statement, national security risks may be raised by entities due to the
nature of their activities and by assets due to their nature (and in the
case of land, due to the nature or location of the land). National
security threats may include acts of terrorism or actions of hostile
states related to cyber-warfare, supply chain disruption of certain
goods or services, disruptive or destructive actions or sabotage of
sensitive sites and espionage or leverage.
Extended Jurisdiction and Proposed Remedies
The Government proposed short-term and long-term reforms to
address these issues. In short term, it proposed to lower the turnover
thresholds for:
1. Dual use and military use sector
2. Parts of the advanced technology sector.77
In 2018, by an Order which is still before the Parliament, the
Government proposed changes in these respective areas.78 The Order
focuses on two respective areas:
1. Restricted goods
2. Advanced computing.
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For the longer term, the Government proposed an expanded scrutiny of
FDIs by putting in place a notification regime that would cover a
broader range of FDIs.79
The new regime would allow the review of a far wider range of
transactions than existing legislations. There are a number of trigger
events that may be reviewed on national security grounds (for example
the acquisition of significant influence or control over an entity or
asset).80 If a trigger event is either contemplated or in progress, the
parties to the transaction may make a voluntary notification to the
Government. Parties may enter into informal discussion with the
Government about specific trigger events. Where a trigger event is
notified, the Government will ask for detailed information about the
trigger event (including its purpose and expected date) and the
acquirer (including details of other investments). The Government
would undertake a preliminary screening review lasting 15 working
days, which may be extended for an additional 15 days for complex
cases. It would then decide whether to call in the trigger event and the
decision to call in a trigger event would be made public.81 Completed
transactions could be called in within six months.82
The Government has the power to call in a trigger event if the parties
choose not to notify it, provided the statutory call-in test is met. This
test has two limbs which are based on reasonable grounds to suspect
that a trigger event has occurred or is in progress or contemplation;
and that the trigger event may give rise to a risk to national security.
The factors the Government may consider when exercising the call-in
power include the target risk (areas of the economy where the
Government considers national security risks are more likely to arise),
the risk for the trigger event to give rise to national security risks; and
the risk that the acquirers may raise national security concerns. 83
In the event that the Government is assessing a trigger event that has
already taken place, once it has been called in, parties must not take
any further measures that increase the acquirer’s control, nor take
steps that would make it more difficult for the trigger event to be
unwound. The Government may impose additional interim restrictions
(limited to the prohibition of either the sharing of specific information
or access to specified sites) where relevant.84 The Government would
have up to 30 days to assess any trigger event. If it is determined that
there is a risk to national security and that further consideration is
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necessary, the period may be extended by up to an additional 45 days.85
The Government may impose conditions for the approval of a
transaction if it believes a national security risk is posed and the
respective remedy is proportionate to that risk, and there is no other
more adequate and proportionate power available for the Government
to exercise.86
The White Paper describes the new criminal offences and civil
sanctions for breaches of requirements to be introduced by the
Government, which may be in addition to more flexible administrative
penalties (such as director disqualification).87 A maximum custodial
sentence of five years will be available for most offences. Breaches of
information-gathering powers will attract lesser sanctions. Civil fines
could also be imposed (up to 10 percent of worldwide turnover for a
business, or up to 10 percent of total income (or £500,000, whichever
is higher for an individual). Finally, judicial scrutiny of substantive
decisions would be limited to strict judicial review grounds in which
case courts cannot supplant ministers’ decisions, considering that they
are directly accountable to Parliament.88
Under the proposed changes to the UK national security regime,
decisions on the national security review of foreign investments would
be separate from competition assessment and would not involve the
CMA as is the structure now. Decisions would instead be taken by a
Cabinet-level minister (Secretaries of State, the Chancellor, or the
Prime Minister). The proposed new regime is similar in many ways to
the CFIUS regime in the United States. The CFIUS, established by an
Executive Order in 1975, is an interagency body, which consists of nine
Cabinet members, comprising the Departments of the Treasury (chair),
Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, Energy, and
the Offices of the US Trade Representative, and Science & Technology
Policy. 89 The Secretary of Labor and the Director of National
Intelligence serve as ex officio members, with roles as defined by
statute and regulation.90 The official notification and review process
starts with the filing of a voluntary notice by the parties to a proposed
transaction.91 CFIUS, based on a risk-based analysis of the national
security threat posed by a transaction, has the authority to negotiate,
impose, or enforce any agreement or condition with the parties in order
to mitigate any threat to US national security.92 CFIUS may initiate a
45-days-investigation of the transaction, that could be extended for an
additional 15 day period under extraordinary circumstances.93 If a
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CFIUS member recommends that the transaction be prohibited, or
CFIUS believes that a Presidential determination is appropriate, it may
refer the matter to the US President, who has 15 days to decide. The
President is under no obligation to follow the recommendation of
CFIUS to suspend or prohibit the transaction. The President must
conclude that other US laws are inadequate or inappropriate to protect
the national security, and he/she must have credible evidence that the
foreign investment will impair the national security.94
Aspects of the UK economy that are particularly likely to give rise to
national security risks, include core national infrastructure sectors (the
civil nuclear, communications, defense, energy, and transport sectors);
certain advanced technologies (including computing, networking and
data communication, and quantum technologies) are similar to the
critical industries that fall within the scope of the CFIUS regime as
discussed above. The type of trigger events that may be reviewed on
national security grounds is similar to the concept of covered
transaction defined by the US FINSA.95 Finally, the judicial scrutiny of
substantive decisions is a welcome feature as it contributes to
accountability and a similar one to the CFIUS process.

Conclusion
The article established when deciding on national security concerns
and M&A transactions raise, the UK Secretary of State seems to enjoy
unlimited discretion. In this sense, if a transaction potentially creates
national security concerns, it is crucial that the parties have the ability
to predict the outcomes of the competent authorities’ and decision
makers’ assessments based on the analysis of transparent factors.
Otherwise, it is very likely that the process becomes uncertain and
unpredictable.
This article discussed how national security concerns have been
addressed in the assessment of transactions by the CMA and other
competent authorities. Unsurprisingly, concerns that relate to national
security have usually arisen in transactions that relate to the
military/defense sector. By the end of 2019, the Secretary of State
issued 2 SPINs, 2 PIINs, and 5 EINs to assess and remedy any adverse
effects on national security. However, the focus has changed in the
recent years, and the types of sectors where transactions can induce
national security concerns has expanded. This is exemplified in the
67

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 2

recent legislative initiative by the UK Government to extend national
security grounds reflects a new approach towards FDI in various
sectors. It also shows that the concept of national security is broadened
to include critical infrastructure and advanced technologies. As the
proposals in that respect would potentially affect a wide range of
markets where dual-use of the facilities or technologies are involved,
transparency and effective judicial review are of utmost importance to
provide certainty and safety.
It also seems to be a positive step to remove CMA from the
aforementioned process of assessment of national security concerns
since the sole ministerial decision-making could decrease the level of
bureaucracy. It is noteworthy that the CMA has itself outlined its role in
the assessment of transactions raising national security concerns. It has
stated repeatedly that the CMA is not expert in national security
matters and therefore, in Phase 1, it only summarizes the
representations made to it.96 Nonetheless, the CMA does provide
advice on features which might, in general, strengthen the effectiveness
of any suitable remedies.
In the longer term, the UK government intends to follow the example of
other developed countries and make more substantive changes to how
it scrutinizes the national security implications of foreign investment.
The reforms have a particular focus on ensuring adequate scrutiny of
whether significant foreign investment in critical businesses raises any
national security concerns and providing the ability to act in
circumstances where this might be the case. The expectation is that the
need to act would be relatively rare, but the risk that this can turn into a
tool to implement industrial policy considerations does exist.
The initiatives by many jurisdictions to extend national security focus
reflects a suspicion towards FDIs masking other geopolitical interests.
These concerns, in part, are covered by the UK governments by their
aforementioned steps to implement a new national security
framework.97 It is important to emphasize that as Stephan has
suggested, retaking broader political interference based on public
interest grounds might undermine the consistency and certainty of the
merger control process.98 To conclude, the national security
assessment process will benefit from transparency, well defined
concepts, clear structure of the reviews, accountability and speed.
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Otherwise, the adverse income on incoming FDI can be significant and
unwelcome.
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